In this paper, we present an effective code-based linkable ring signature scheme based on Borromean ring signature. The security of the scheme is based on the hardness of Syndrome Decoding problem, General Syndrome Decoding problem and Codeword Finding problem. We prove that our scheme has all the properties that a linkable ring signature scheme should have: unforgeability, anonymity, linkability and non-slanderability. Efficiency analysis shows that our scheme has a smaller signature size than the existing scheme under the same security conditions. Furthermore, this signature scheme can be easily extended to multiple layers. That is, code-based multilayer linkable ring signature scheme can be obtained and used for transactions with multiple inputs.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND
Blockchain has been widely used in many fields since its introduction in 2008 [1] - [5] , but there are still many problems that restrict its development. Such as, how to protect user's privacy how to prevent double spending. Recent research indicates that linkable ring signature scheme can solve these two problems well.
Ring signature, which was first introduced by Rivest in [6] , is a technique for anonymously revealing reliable messages. It can be seen as a simplified group signature scheme without group administrator, establishment and member revocation process. The member's information in the ring is a part of the final signature result. In a ring signature scheme, the signer first selects a temporary set of signers, including the signer itself. User can sign with his private key and the public key of other members of the ring without the consent of other members. The verifier is able to confirm that the signature is from a ring, but do not know who is the real signer. It is well known that the user's anonymity is achieved.
Later, linkable ring signature was proposed in [7] . A linkable ring signature scheme that must satisfy the linkability.
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It means that, if the signer signs two messages using the same private key, he will be found. This property can be used to guarantee the prevention of double spending.
Monero has used this anonymity and linkability in cryptocurrencies to prevent double spending and protect user's privacy [8] , [9] . The security of their scheme is based on the discrete logarithm problem of elliptic curves. As everyone knows, many cryptographic schemes based on classical number theory are suffered from future quantum computer's threats [10] . Therefore, it is very meaningful to study the construction of post-quantum linkable ring signature scheme. Currently post-quantum signature research is mostly focused on four different approaches: hash-based, multivariate-based, code-based, and lattice-based. Authors in [11] proposed a linkable ring signature scheme with stealth addresses (SALRS). This scheme enables both payer and payee of the transaction to be hidden in the cryptocurrency. In this paper, we focus on construction of code-based linkable ring signature scheme.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTION
Using the same structure as Monero's in [8] , [9] , we present an effective code-based linkable ring signature scheme based on Borromean ring signature [12] . In our scheme, we use an exact indistinguishable distribution to generate signature. At the same time, the signature size of this scheme is linear in number of user N and the size of q in finite field. Analysis shows that our scheme has a smaller signature size under the same security conditions. A comparison is given in Table 1 below.
Furthermore, the scheme we proposed can be easily extended to multiple layers. We also present a code-based multilayer linkable ring signature scheme which can be used for transactions with multiple inputs.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THIS PAPER
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce some preliminary results including the definition and security model of linkable ring signature. Coedbased linkable ring signature, the main contribution of this paper will be described in section 3. Coed-based multilayer linkable ring signature is given in section 4. In section 5, a formal security prove for our schemes will be presented. We conclude this work by analyzing the signature size of our scheme.
II. RELATED WORK
Since the (linkable) ring signature was introduced, many schemes have been proposed. These schemes can divide into classic (linkable) ring signature schemes and post-quantum (linkable) ring signatures schemes. In this paper, we mainly focus on code-based linkable ring signature schemes, so we introduce some research progress on classical (linkable) ring signatures and code-based (linkable) ring signatures.
A. CLASSICAL (LINKABLE) RING SIGNATURES
There are many (linkable) ring signature schemes rely on the hardness problems of number-theoretic. Here we only list some of them, such as the schemes in [14] - [26] . Some of these schemes have specific application scenarios, such as the schemes in [16] and [17] are based on certificates and identity-based, respectively. The signature size in [6] , [20] , [24] - [26] is linear with the number of signers. The scheme in [18] is a linkable version of [27] , retains the constant size signature.
B. CODE-BASED (LINKABLE) RING SIGNATURES
Code-based ring signatures were first introduced in 2007 [28] . Then, some code-based ring signature schemes and many other variants have been proposed have been proposed [29] - [32] . Such as, schemes in [29] , [30] are threshold ring signature. Reference [32] proposed an undeniable signature scheme.
Code-based linkable ring signatures were first introduced in [13] . They construct code-based linkable ring signature by using the Fiat-Shamir transform. The GStern's protocol need repeated 140 time in their scheme. It makes the signature size so large.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give some preliminary results as well as the definition and security model of linkable ring signature.
A. HAMMING DISTANCE, WEIGHT

Definition 1 (Hamming Distance, Weight): Hamming distance d(u, v) of two words u
The Hamming weight w(u) of the word u is the Hamming distance between u and 0, where 0 is a word containing n 0 s.
B. HARD PROBLEMS
We first present 3 NP-complete problems: the Syndrome Decoding, General Syndrome Decoding and Codeword Finding assumption, which will be used for the subsequent scheme constructed [33] .
Definition 2 (Syndrome Decoding (SD) Problem): Given random A is a (n − k) × n matrix over F q , S ∈ F n−k q and an integer t > 0, find a vector e ∈ F n q with w(e) ≤ t, such that Ae = S where w(e) is the Hamming weight of e and t is a positive integer. Definition 3 (General Syndrome Decoding problem): Given random A, B ∈ F n×(n−k) q , S, T ∈ F n−k q and an integer t > 0, find a vector e ∈ F n q with w(e) ≤ t, such that Ae = S and Be = T , where w(e) is the Hamming weight of e and t are positive integers. Definition 4 (Codeword Finding (CF) Problem): Given a random matrix A ∈ F (n−k)×n q and an integer t > 0, find a non-zero vector e ∈ F n q with w(e) ≤ t, such that Ae = 0.
C. LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE
The syntax of a linkable ring signature can be seen in [7] , [26] . There are five algorithms in a linkable ring signature scheme. Definition 5 (Linkable Ring Signature): 1) Setup: The input to this algorithm is a security parameter and outputs the public parameters. 2) KeyGen: The input to this algorithm is public parameter and outputs the user's public key and private key. 3) Sign: The input to this algorithm is the public parameter, message m, signer's private key, user's public key list and outputs the signature.
4) Verify:
The input to this algorithm is the signature on message m and outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. 1 and 0 indicate that the signature is a valid signature or an invalid signature respectively. 5) Link: The input to this algorithm is two signatures on two messages and outputs 0 or 1.
D. SECURITY MODEL OF LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE
A secure linkable ring signature must be correctness, unforgeable, anonymous, linkable and non-slanderable. The security model of linkable ring signature we adopt is based on [34] . Definition 6 (Correctness): The signature, generated by the legal signer after executes the signature algorithm correctly, can pass the verification algorithm with probability 1.
In the following definitions, we use L = {pk i | i ∈ [1, N ]} to denote the list of the public keys of users in the signature scheme and need to assume four oracles named join oracle O J , key generation oracleO K , signature oracle O S , and hash oracle O H .
• O J : On input a new user join request, outputs pk i for new user.
• O K : On input a pk i , outputs the corresponding sk i .
where pk i is generated by O K , a message m, outputs a valid signature σ .
• O H : Outputs a hash value. We use S, C to denote the simulator and adversary. C is given the access to O J , O K , O S and O H . The unforgeability, anonymity, linkablility and non-slanderability for linkable ring signature are defined by the following games between a simulator S and an adversary C. In the following description param. denotes system parameter.
Unforgeability: Considered Game 1, as shown in TABLE 2, C first generates a signature for message m using a public key list L obtained from S, calls the verify algorithm and gets an output b. 
Anonymity:
Anonymity means that it is impossible for adversary to distinguish the signer's pk with probability 1/2. We consider game for anonymity as shown in TABLE 3.
C wins Game 2 if the following conditions are met:
• pk 0 and pk 1 cannot be used in O K and O S . C wins Game 3 if the following conditions are met:
• C just can make O K query once and obtain private key sk i corresponding to the public key pk i .
Definition 9: The linkable ring signature is anonymous if for all PPT adversaries C, Adv ano
A is negligible.
Non-slanderability:
Non-slanderability means that an adversary cannot frame an honest user for producing a signature linked with another signature not signed by the user. That is, if there are two valid linkable ring signatures which were correctly generated with different sk s, they should be unlinked. C wins Game 4 if the following conditions are met:
• The generation process of σ L (m) does not use pk π and sk π . 
IV. CODE-BASED LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we will give the construction of our codebased ring signature scheme.
There are five algorithms named (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Link) in our code-based linkable ring signature scheme, which described as follows.
A. SETUP
The input of the setup is an security parameter λ, outputs are n, k, t ∈ N + , such that n > k, A, B ← F (n−k)×n q . We use w( * ) to denote the Hamming weight of * . H : H (·) → F q is a hash function.
B. KEYGEN
The inputs of the KeyGen algorithm is the public parameters, then it outputs the private-key and public-key for each user P i as follow.
Then the public key is PK i and the private key is e i .
C. SIGN
Assuming that the selected set is S = {1, 2, . . . , N } and the π ∈ S is the true signer. The input of the Sign algorithm is the private key e π , message m, the set of user's public key list L = {PK i | i = 1, 2, · · · , N } and the public parameters A, B. The output of this algorithm is the signature σ . The details are described below: Au, Bu) .
4) Calculate
The signature is σ = (d 1 , (r z,i ), T π ).
Given two valid signatures for different message,
If T π = T π , return 1, we claim that both signatures are come from the same user. Otherwise return 0.
V. MULTILAYER CODE-BASED LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE SCHEME
The proposed scheme in section IV can be extended to a multilayer linkable ring signature scheme, which are applied for confidential transactions with multiple inputs. We take a voting problem as an instance. An institution organizes a voting system that uses a multiple vote, the voter can vote for any subset of the alternatives. So, a voter might vote for Alice, Bob, and Charlie, rejecting Daniel and Emily. In order to protect the privacy of voters and prevent secondary voting, this voting can be organized in the blockchain and implemented through a multilayer linkable ring signature scheme. Regarding voting result for each candidate as an input, the voter can choose a ring member set {1, 2, . . . , N } among all voters to generate a linkable ring signature scheme using different private keys. In this way, the privacy of voters can be protected, and when voters vote twice on any candidate, they will be discovered through linkability.
We assume that each user has M secret keys to sign and propose a scheme with a set of N · M keys. The definition of linkability and the construction of the new multilayer linkable ring signature is presented below.
Definition 11 (Linkability): If any private keys e π,j used in two different signature, then these signatures would be linked.
Remark 1: In our multilayer linkable ring signature, we require i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }.
A. SETUP
The input of the setup is an security parameter λ, outputs are n, k, t ∈ N , such that n > k, A, B ← F (n−k)×n q . We use w( * ) to denote the Hamming weight of * . H : H (·) → F q is a hash function.
B. KEYGEN
The inputs of the Key Generation algorithm is the public parameters, then it outputs the private-key and public-key for each P ij for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N } and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M } as follow. The subscript i indicates the i − th user and j indicates the user's j − th secret key.
• Pick e ij ← F n q such that w(e ij ) ≤ t.
Then the public keys are PK ij and the private keys are e ij .
C. SIGN
Assuming that the selected set is S = {1, 2, . . . , N } and the π ∈ S is the true signer. The input of the Sign algorithm is the private key e π,j , message m, the set of user's public key list L = {PK ij }, and the public parameters A, B. The output of this algorithm is the signature σ . The details are described below:
• Calculate T j = Be π,j for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }. • Choose u j ← F n q with w(u j ) ≤ t uniform randomly. • Calculate d π+1 = H (L, T π,j , m, Au 1 , Au 2 , . . . , Au M , Bu 1 , Bu 2 , . . . , Bu M ). 1) For i = π + 1, π + 2, . . . , 1, 2, . . . , π − 1, a) Choose
The signature is σ = (d 1 , (r i,j ), T j ).
D. VERIFY
1) For i = 1, 2, . . . , N , compute
2) If d 1 = d 1 output 1, else output 0.
E. LINK
If T j = T j , return 1, we claim that both signatures are come from the same private key. Otherwise return 0.
VI. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the correctness and security of our schemes. We prove that our schemes have the usual properties for a linkable ring signature. Such as unforgeability, anonymity, linkability and non slanderability. Because the multi-layered scheme is an extension of the single-layer scheme, we just give proof of the single-layer scenario. The proof of the multi-layer case is similar.
A. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
Theorem 1: The verify process is correct.
Proof: For code-based linkable ring signature, the verify algorithm works as following:
1) If i = π, then d i+1 can be obtained by the Sign algorithm. 2) if i = π , then t π,1 = Ar z,π − d π PK π = A(u + d π e π ) − d π Ae π = Au + Ad π e π − d π Ae π = Au t π,2 = Br z,π − d π T π = B(u + d π e π ) − d π Be π = Bu + Bd π e π − d π Be π = Bu So, in this case d i+1 = d i+1 holds. For multilayer code-based linkable ring signature, the verify algorithm works as following:
1) If i = π , then d i+1 can be obtained by the Sign. algorithm. 2) if i = π , then (t π,j ) 1 = Ar π,j − d π,j PK π,j = A(u j + d π,j e π,j ) − d π,j Ae π,j = Au j + Ad π,j e π,j − d π,j Ae π,j = Au j (t π,j ) 2 = Br π,j − d π,j T j = B(u j + d π,j e π,j ) − d π,j Be π,j = Bu j + Bd π,j e π,j − d π,j Be π,j = Bu j
In other words, it holds also that d i+1 = d i+1 . In conclusion, the verification process is correct.
Theorem 2: The linkabile process is correct. It means that if an honest user π generates signatures for two different messages use the same public key list, which can pass the verify algorithm, then the link-ability tags must equal.
Proof: Suppose an honest user π generates signatures for two different messages m, m by using the different public key list L, L and same private key. And both the signature can pass the verify algorithm. The link-ability tags are T π , T π . We show that T π = T π is always held.
Since the tags are generated by the same user in the same system, the private keys and the public parameters are equal. Therefore, the following equation will be established.
Pr[T π = Be π = T π ] = 1.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we will give the security proof of our scheme. In the following proofs, we need three oracles O K , O S , and O H introduced in section 2.
Theorem 3: The proposed scheme is unforgeable under the CF assumption.
Proof: Suppose an adversary C could forge the linkable signature, we will show that there is a polynomial algorithm that can solve the CF problems with non-negligible probability. We will assume there's a simulator S. It can output signatures for a signer even if he knows nothing about the user's private key in the random oracle model.
The simulator S works as following: Setup
• Choose a pk π ∈ L. • Make a key generation oracle O K , obtained the corresponding sk π . Hashquery We assume that adversary C can make queries in O H . H responds with (d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d w ). The response of H is stored in list H − list by adversary C.
Sign In this process, adversary C use the result of the Hashquery, do the follows: N , 1, . . . , π − 1 :
• Calculate d i+1 = H (L, T π , m, t i,1 , t i,2 ). 4) Set d π+1 ← H (L, T π , m, Au, Bu). 5) Return (d 1 , (r z,i ), T π ). If the signature can pass the verify algorithm then we consider d j+1 is obtained after C makes the Hashquery. Now, we compare the forged signatures with legitimate ones:
we can find a preimage of d j .
So, we have
That is:
We assume that r z,i = r z,i , so C can find a non-zero vector s = r z,i − r z,i with w(r z,i ) ≤ 2t such that As = 0 and Bs = 0. It means that C can solve the CF problem.
Theorem 4: The proposed scheme is anonymity under the SD assumption.
Proof: Suppose there's a simulator S can be output signatures for a signer l even if he knows nothing about the private key e l of l.
The simulator S works as below: Setup Suppose m is the message to be signed and L is the public key list. We use D t to denote any set of 0 ≤ t < N . Choose a pk l ∈ L, ∀sk i ∈ D t , (pk l , sk i ) is not obtained by KeyGen.
Sign In this process, simulator S uses back-patching to generated d 1 and does the follows: 1) Choose a random e ∈ F n q with w(e) ≤ t and compute T l = Be.
, T l ). The signature can pass the verify algorithm, then we compare the forged signatures with legitimate ones, we can see: T l = Be where e is chosen random from F n q is not obtained from e l . It means that an adversary cannot distinguish T l = Be and T l = Be l .
So, we can find a e such that T l = Be and the SD problem can be solved.
Theorem 5: Our scheme is linkable under the GSD assumption.
Proof: We assume there's an adversary C and a simulator S. S works as following:
• S can use the KeyGen algorithm to generate the private key e i and the public key pk i for the user in the set. When adversary C makes a KeyGen query, S gives a response by the e π .
• Suppose that adversary C generates two signatures σ, σ for the message m, m with the list L, L . Both signatures can pass the verification algorithm. Then we can obtain:
Reducing these equations, we can get:
Sice pk π = Ae π , T = Be π , we have:
The following two cases are discussed. 1) If (d − d ) = r z,i − r z,i , then
This hypothesis contradicts the tag T is different from all created tags honestly.
2) If (d − d ) = (r z,i − r z,i ), then, we can find a same s = r z,i − r z,i with w(s) ≤ 2t such that
It means that GSD problem can be solved. The authors in [34] have proved that all linkable ring signature schemes that satisfy unforgeability and linkability are satisfies non slanderability. So, we can claim that our scheme is non-slanderable by theorem 3 and theorem 5.
Theorem 6: Our scheme is non-slanderable under the CF and GSD assumption.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will discuss the parameter selection and the comparison of code-based linkable ring signature.
We consider the parameter selection the same as [13] . n = 1268, k = n/2, and t = 130. Note that, even if knowing t/2 positions of the error vector, the code with these parameters still has a security of at least 80 bits.
In our scheme, we set q = 2 s , the signature size is related to the value of s and the number of users N . The size of our signature is (1+(N +1)n−k)s bits. Specific analysis is given below.
The signature is (d 1 , (r z,i ), T π ), i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
• For d 1 ∈ F q , it has s bits.
• For each r z,i , it consists of ns bits.
• The size of Tag is same as the public key, consists of (n − k)s bits. This account in total is s + N × nsbits + (n − k)sbits = (1 + (N + 1)n − k)sbits.
For n = 1268, k = 634, we consider the value of q to be at least 256, that is, s is equal to 8. The parameter settings and size for our scheme is shown in Table 2 . We give four different version of our scheme. There versions vary with the value of s.
In terms of performance, our scheme is compared with some existing schemes in the literature [13] as shown in Table 1 . It can be show that our scheme is better than these schemes.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, single-layer and multilayer code-based linkable ring signature schemes based on Borromean ring signature were addressed. They correspond to the case of single input and multiple inputs respectively. Then, we proved the security of proposed schemes under the assumptions of Syndrome Decoding problem, General Syndrome Decoding and Codeword Finding problem. The results showed that our schemes have all the properties that a linkable ring signature scheme should have, i.e., unforgeability, anonymity, linkability and non-slanderability. Efficiency analysis showed that the schemes have smaller signature size than the existing scheme under the same security conditions. In future, we will consider improving the size of the public key for code-based linkable ring signature. More experimental constructions for linkable ring signature scheme, e.g. hash-based, multivariate-based and lattice-based are also our future work. 
